ABSTRACT The precoding-aided spatial modulation (PSM) is first characterized with respect to its secrecy performance, which shows that the PSM is a secrecy embedded communication scheme when operated in the time-division duplex mode, but experiences security risk under frequency-division duplex mode. Therefore, we extend the PSM to a secret PSM (SPSM) that is suitable for operation in any communications scenarios experiencing passive eavesdropping. In the proposed SPSM, the secrecy performance is enhanced by using a part of transmit power to interfere the eavesdropper's reception. In this paper, the secrecy performance of SPSM with discrete inputs is comprehensively investigated in terms of both bit error rate and secrecy rate and by both analysis and simulations. Relying on the asymptotic analysis, we also derive the upper and lower bounds for the error performance and secrecy rate of SPSM. Furthermore, we study the power allocation between information and interference transmission in order to maximize SPSM's secrecy performance. Our studies result in a range of expressions, which are validated by Monte Carlo simulations. Furthermore, our studies demonstrate that the analytical formulas are beneficial to the optimization of SPSM systems for maximizing its security performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications may suffer from eavesdropping attack due to its broadcast nature. Spread-spectrum techniques [1] have usually been used to resist eavesdropping for achieving low-probability-interception (LPI) transmission. However, their security relies on the privacy of the pseudo-noise (PN) sequences shared between a transmitter and its desired receiver. To circumvent this shortcoming, precoding-aided spatial modulation (PSM) [2] - [4] and directional modulation (DM) [5] - [8] have been re-designed for secret wireless transmission without requiring pre-shared PN sequences or secret keys between a transmitter-receiver pair. In this paper, our focus is on the PSM-assisted secrecy communications. In PSM systems, there are two types of modulations employed for information transmission over MIMO channels, which are the space shift keying (SSK) [9] and conventional amplitude-phase modulation (APM). The SSK is implemented using the indices of receiver antennas, with the aid of a zero-forcing precoder (ZFP) or a minimum mean square error precoder (MMSEP). PSM employs two distinctive advantages [10] , [11] : i) information transmission in spatial domain, and ii) low-complexity detection provided by the embedded precoding. Owing to its merits, PSM has been regarded as a promising signaling scheme for operation in conjunction with massive MIMO, millimeter wave (mm-Wave), etc., of the 5th generation (5G) wireless techniques [12] - [15] . In [3] and [4] , we have identified PSM's third distinctive advantage for facilitating secret communications. In PSM, the portion of information conveyed by the SSK acts actually as a PN sequence, which randomly activates one of the receive antennas to enable the receive antenna's activation patterns to be controlled directly by the random source information. At the receiver side, this information can be readily decoded by observing the antenna activation patterns. However, an eavesdropper will be much hard to demodulate the information carried by the SSK of the PSM. This is because the precoder, such as ZFP, MMSEP, etc., is designed only based on the channel state information (CSI) of the desired receiver and, hence, the antenna activation patterns do not appear at the eavesdropper. Therefore, PSM can be a secret, or at least, a LPI transmission scheme, when it is operated in the scenarios where eavesdroppers are hard to estimate the channels between a transmitter-receiver pair, and consequently, hard to know the precoder in the ZFP or MMSEP principles.
The above arguments hold true, when the PSM is operated in the time-division duplex (TDD) mode, where no CSI feedback from receiver to transmitter is required. However, when operated in the frequency-division duplex (FDD) mode, a feedback link may be required to send the CSI estimated at a receiver to its transmitter. By overhearing this feedback channel, an eavesdropper may obtain the CSI sent by the receiver and hence, knows the precoder. In this case, the eavesdropper may also reliably detect the information sent by the PSM, provided that it has a sufficient signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for detection, as shown later in Section II. In order to prevent from eavesdropping in both TDD and FDD modes, we need to enhance the PSM by designing a so-called secret precoder, which should not be recovered by any eavesdropper, even when it knows the exact CSI used for designing the precoder. With this motivation, in this paper, we propose a secret PSM (SPSM), which operates a time-varying precoder obtained by adding some artificial perturbation (AP) to the ZFP. As shown in our forthcoming discourses, our SPSM employs all the advantages of the original PSM, such as, low-complexity detection, when viewed from the desired receiver. By contrast, from an eavesdropper, the time-variant AP added to the precoder makes its detection much hard.
A. RELATED WORK
In literature, there are several references, e.g. [16] - [20] , having investigated the security issues of the conventional SM [12] , which uses the indices of transmit antennas to convey information in the spatial domain. Since the conventional SM usually uses only one to several radiofrequency (RF) chains for transmission, the multiple transmit antennas may not be effectively exploited for preventing from eavesdropping. By contrast, the PSM with MIMO precoding employs the capability to elevate the secrecy performance of wireless transmission, in addition to its simplified receiver [3] , [4] , [21] . For example, PSM's secrecy performance can be significantly improved by designing a precoding matrix so as to maximize the ratio between the received power of the desired receiver and that of the eavesdropper [3] . However, this optimization requires the transmitter to know the eavesdropper's CSI. Hence, it is only suitable for the communication scenarios where an active eavesdropper exists, but not suitable for the communication environments conflicting a passive eavesdropper. In [4] , we have firstly extended the PSM to the SPSM for mitigating passive eavesdropping, and obtained the optimum power-allocation between ZFP and AP. However, the power-allocation in [4] has to be dependent on the Monte Carlo simulations, which imposes a heavy computation burden on the transmitter, especially, when the system has a large input-output dimension or uses a higher order of APM.
The power-allocation in SPSM systems shares the similarity as that in the MIMO wiretap channels, where artificial noise (AN) [22] is used to cripple the reception of passive eavesdroppers. Therefore, below we review some recent progress in AN's power-allocation. Zhou and McKay [24] have first considered the optimal power-allocation between an information-bearing signal and an AN, when assuming communication over multiple-input single-output (MISO) Rayleigh fading channels. Specifically, under the assumption of a noiseless eavesdropper, a closed-form formula for the lower bound of the achievable secrecy rate has first been derived, which is then used to optimize the power allocation. In more detail, let the numbers of antennas employed at the transmitter, receiver and the eavesdropper be N t , N r and N e , respectively. The studies in [23] show that when operated in high SNR region, it is near-optimal to distribute half of the transmission power to the AN in the case of conflicting a MISO single-antenna eavesdropper (MISOSE), and √ N e /(1 + √ N e ) of the transmission power to the AN in the case of MISO multi-antenna eavesdropper (MISOME). In [24] , the same assumption of noiseless eavesdropper has been considered for the case of MIMO multi-antenna eavesdropper (MIMOME). However, the results in [24] and [25] have been obtained by considering the worst case and also ignoring thermal noise at the eavesdropper, making them usually not suitable for application in low SNR region. In [25] , tight bounds for the ergodic secrecy rate of various MIMO systems using AN have been studied, when assuming that there are a large number of transmit antennas. From the studies in [25] we are implied that N e /(N r + N e ) of the transmission power should be allocated to the AN in high SNR region, while no power is allocated to the AN in low SNR region.
All the above-mentioned references have assumed the Gaussian input signals for deriving the closed-form expressions for the ergodic secrecy rate. Despite the information theoretic optimality of the Gaussian input signals, practical signals for communications are typically non-Gaussian, and constructed from a finite alphabet, such as, phase-shift keying (PSK) symbols, quadrature-amplitude modulation (QAM) symbols, etc. In this case, power-allocation in physical-layer security systems becomes more challenging. This is because the MIMO channels with finite-alphabet inputs belong to the category of the discrete-input continuous-output memoryless channels (DCMC) [26] , [27] , whose closed-form expressions VOLUME 6, 2018 for rate/capacity are extremely hard to obtain. Consequently, Monte Carlo simulations are usually relied on for finding the DCMC's capacity [26] - [29] . Due to the absence of closedform formulas for the secrecy rate of DCMC channels, the relationship existing between the mutual information of MIMO systems and the MMSE detector may be exploited for transmit power-control [30] or precoder optimization [31] . However, to the best of our knowledge, there is short of research about the optimization of AN, including both the AN signaling design and power-allocation, in the context of the DCMC channels. Our SPSM studied in this contribution belongs to this category, and there are no closed-form expressions available from references for its secrecy rate. Hence, as previous mentioned, the optimization for power-allocation between ZFP and AP is highly challenging.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS AND OUTCOMES
In this paper, we first demonstrate the principles of the SPSM and, then, investigate the secrecy performance of the SPSM, which includes both the bit error rate (BER) performance and the secrecy capacity. Our studies show that in the general cases, it is extremely hard (if it is not impossible) to derive the meaningful closed-form expressions for the error and secrecy performance, based on which we can derive the optimum power-allocation. For this sake, we carry out the asymptotic analysis by assuming that the SPSM system has a big number of transmit antennas, which is significantly larger than the number of antennas at the receiver and also that at the eavesdropper.
Specifically, when the error performance is considered, if the SPSM system uses a big number of transmit antennas, the artificial interference presenting at the eavesdropper can be approximated as additive white Gaussian noise. In this case, the equivalent signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at the eavesdropper is determined by the power assigned by the transmitter to the AP. Therefore, the transmitter can directly control the error performance of the eavesdropper's detection via assigning a corresponding power to the AP. Furthermore, under the asymptotic assumption, we can derive the BER union-bounds for both the receiver and the eavesdropper. Based on the above observations and with the aid of the BER union-bounds, the transmitter of SPSM is capable of carrying out the corresponding power-allocation, so as to make the error performance at the eavesdropper worst, while maintaining the error performance at the receiver above the required level.
In the context of the secrecy capacity, we first provide an exact expression for the secrecy rate, which is however not in closed-form. Based on the formula obtained, the secrecy capacity can be obtained by maximizing the achievable secrecy rate via optimum power-allocation. However, in this case, the secrecy rate has to be evaluated by Monte Carlo simulations, and the secrecy capacity has to be obtained via the exhaustive search by using a huge number of realizations of the possible power-allocation. By contrast, under the asymptotic scenario where the number of transmit antennas is large, we are able to derive a closed-form formula for the approximate secrecy rate. From this formula we can readily find a near-optimal power-allocation solution via the one dimensional search, which is not dependent on the complicated computations as Monte-Carlo simulation. Our studies show that, although our analytical results are obtained in the asymptotic cases and by imposing some approximation, the power-allocation obtained in this way is in general close to the optimum one, even when the number of transmit antennas is limited, as demonstrated by our numerical and simulation results shown in Section VI. In addition to the above-mentioned, in this paper, we furthermore derive the asymptotic results for achieving the near-optimal powerallocation, when the SPSM is operated in either low or high SNR region.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We begin with considering the PSM over the MIMO wiretap channels in section II, where we also explain the LPI characteristics of the PSM under the TDD mode. In section III, the secrecy performance of the PSM is enhanced by introducing the SPSM, which is capable of providing secure transmission under both the TDD and FDD modes. In the following two sections, i.e., in section IV and section V, we analyze both the error performance and the capacity performance of the SPSM, based on which we address the power-allocation issues. The performance results and discussion are provided in section VI and, finally, we conclude this paper in section VII. = max(0, x) and E[·] evaluates the expectation with respect to all the random variables within the bracket. Finally, log is used for the base two logarithm while Q(x) is the Gaussian Q-function defined as
II. PSM OVER MIMOME CHANNELS
We consider the communication scenario that a transmitter sends messages to a receiver in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. 
where e e e i is the i-th column of an identity matrix I I I N r , representing that the ith antenna of the receiver is activated, while b j ∈ B and satisfies E[|b j | 2 ] = 1. Hence, each PSM symbol can convey in total k = k 1 + k 2 bits information. 
where u u u ∼ CN (0 0 0, σ 2 u I I I N r ) and v v v ∼ CN (0 0 0, σ 2 v I I I N e ) are the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). As in [26] , [31] , and [32] , for simplicity, we assume the same noise power at both the receiver and the eavesdropper, i.e., σ 2 u = σ 2 v = 1/γ , where γ is the average SNR per symbol. In (2) and (3), the matrices H H H ∈ C N r ×N t and H H H e ∈ C N e ×N t represent the channels from the transmitter to the receiver and that from the transmitter to the eavesdropper, respectively. We assume that the transmitter has full knowledge of H H H via the receiver's feedback channels or using channels' reciprocity, but no knowledge about H H H e . The eavesdropper is assumed to be able to estimate its own channel H H H e , using for example, the pilots sent by the transmitter. However, whether the eavesdropper is able to acquire the receiver's channel H H H is depended on the duplex mode operated between the transmitter and receiver, which will be analyzed at the end of this section. Additionally, all the channels are assumed to experience block Rayleigh fading.
The original PSM [2] has been motivated to achieve lowcomplexity detection by designing a precoder P P P, which, according to the information transmitted, uses beamforming to activate only one of the receive antennas, while keeps the other receive antennas silent. This can be implemented with the aid of the ZFP or MMSEP. For the purpose to show the principles, below we consider only the ZFP, which uses the preprocessing matrix of
where
] is a normalization factor for achieving the power constraint of tr(P P PP P P H ) = N r . The ZFP is capable of completely canceling the interantenna interference at the receiver, which can be seen by substituting (4) into (2), yielding
Furthermore, it can be shown that (5) can be decomposed into
From (6) we can know that information only appears on the ith antenna of the receiver, when assuming that a k 1 -bit SSK symbol having a value of i was transmitted. All the other antennas of the receiver output only noise. As shown in [2] , the k 1 -bit SSK symbol and the k 2 -bit APM symbol can be detected using either joint detection (JD) or successive detection (SD). When the JD is employed, the maximum likelihood (ML) detector gives
By contrast, when the SD is employed, the APM symbol is detected after the detection of the SSK symbol aŝ
In comparison with the JD, the SD can significantly reduce the detection complexity, but at the cost of marginal degradation of the achievable BER performance [10] . From the above-described detection principles we can know that, no matter is JD or SD employed, the receiver is capable of achieving the detection, provided that it knows β, instead of the CSI of H H H . Furthermore, when the number of transmit antennas is large, β converges to a constant of 1/ √ N t . In this case, the desired receiver in fact carries out non-coherent detection, which facilitates practical implementation.
Let us now consider how the eavesdropper may intercept the private messages conveyed from the transmitter to the receiver using PSM. Since the precoder P P P is designed based only on the CSI from the transmitter to the receiver, inter-antenna interference still exists among the antennas of the eavesdropper. Therefore, the eavesdropper is unable to demodulate the PSM signal using the low-complexity detection like (7) or (8), even if it employs perfect H H H e . Explicitly, (2) and (3) can also be represented in the forms of
From these equations we have the following observations. Firstly, the PSM acts as a precoding vector hopper, with the hopping pattern {p p p i } formed from P P P under the control of the random messages sent from the transmitter to the receiver. If the channels from the transmitter to the receiver vary sufficiently fast, the transmission from the transmitter to the receiver appears more or less as an 'one-time pad' cryptographic scheme, which is rendered absolutely secure. Secondly, owing to the ZFP, and if the SNR at the receiver is sufficiently high, the receiver can readily capture the hopping pattern via observing its activated antennas. In this way, the receiver can fulfill the detection based on (7) or (8) . Thirdly, the situations for the eavesdropper are very different. As above-mentioned, when the channels from the transmitter to the receiver vary fast, the eavesdropper is incapable of detecting any information sent from the transmitter to the VOLUME 6, 2018
receiver due to the one-time pad effect. By contrast, if the channels from the transmitter to the receiver vary slow, so that the eavesdropper is capable of estimating the joint of H H H e P P P, as seen in (3), the eavesdropper may employ a blind detection scheme [34] , [35] to detect the APM symbol b j . However, the eavesdropper is still incapable of detecting the SSK symbol i, as it is unable to estimate a separate P P P. In order to detect both i and b j , the eavesdropper has to know both its CSI H H H e and the perfect knowledge of P P P (or H H H ). If these are available, the eavesdropper can then implement the JD as
Note that, in TDD systems, the transmitter can estimate the downlink channels H H H using the uplink training signals transmitted by the receiver based on the channels' reciprocity. Since the transmitter and the eavesdropper are separated in space, H H H and H H H e should usually be independent. Consequently, the eavesdropper hardly knows H H H and, hence, P P P, even though it can overhear the pilot signals sent from the receiver. Without the knowledge of P P P, the eavesdropper is unable to implement the detection in the way as shown (11) . Therefore, when operated in the TDD systems, the original PSM as a whole belongs to a LPI communication scheme, which can provide confidential communication between the transmitter and receiver. By contrast, in FDD systems, the transmitter may have to acquire H H H from the receiver via feedback channels. In these communication systems, the eavesdropper may have the chances to know P P P by overhearing H H H sent over the feedback channels from the receiver to the transmitter. Then, the eavesdropper may decode the messages using (11) . In other words, the PSM is not robust to the eavesdropping attack in FDD systems. In the following discourses, we propose a secret PSM (SPSM) scheme that is efficient for operation in both TDD and FDD modes.
III. SECRET PRECODING-AIDED SPATIAL MODULATION
From the analysis in Section II, we can know that the knowledge of P P P to the eavesdropper determines the security level of the PSM system. When the transmitter-receiver channels vary slow, the precoder P P P in (4) also varies slow, which is beneficial to eavesdropping. Therefore, the basic principles behind our SPSM is to construct a precoder P P P, which is capable of retaining the ZFP nature at the desired receiver, while presenting fast time-varying at the eavesdropper, regardless of the time-varying rate of the transmitter-receiver channels. In this way, the one-time pad effect is always experienced by the eavesdropper and, hence, the secrecy performance of the SPSM can be significantly improved.
Let us apply the singular value decomposition on H H H , yielding
where U U U ∈ C N r ×N r is a unitary matrix, is a (N r × N r )-dimensional diagonal matrix containing the non-zero singular values, 0 0 0 is an all-zero matrix, V V V 1 ∈ C N t ×N r and V V V 0 ∈ C N t ×(N t −N r ) determine respectively a signal space and a null space for H H H . Based on (12), the time-varying precoder for the SPSM can be structured as
where ζ is a coefficient that can be adjusted to distribute the transmit power betweenP P P andP P P, while R R R = r r r 1 , · · · , r r r N r ∈ C (N t −N r )×N r is a random matrix whose entries are complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and a variance σ 2 r . As seen in (13), the precoder of the SPSM contains two components: a basic ZFP ofP P P and a time-varying AP ofP P P. SinceP P P is constructed from V V V 0 and lies in the null-space of H H H , we have H H HP P P = 0 0 0. Hence, the AP is automatically canceled, when the transmitted signals arrive at the receiver. In detail, when substituting (13) into (2) and (3), we obtain y y y = ζs s s
Eq. (14) shows that, for the desired receiver, the SPSM inherits all the advantages of the PSM, including the lowcomplexity detection of (8) . . Hence, in principle, the AP in our proposed SPSM acts similarly as the well-known AN [22] . In the SPSM, AP can protect not only the APM symbols but also the SSK symbols, which will become explicit in the forthcoming analysis.
Let the equivalent noise in (15) 
Under the worst scenario where the eavesdropper knows ideally H H H , and hence it can deriveP P P, the eavesdropper can then carry out the optimal detection based on (15) as [39] î ,b j = arg min
Explicitly, the above detection performance of (17) is related to σ 2 r . Hence according to (13) , there exists the powerallocation betweenP P P andP P P, which yields a trade-off between the reliability and security of the transmitter-receiver link. Let the fraction of the total transmit power allocated toP P P be denoted as θ (0 < θ ≤ 1). Then, using the power-constraints tr(P P PP P P H ) = θ N r and E tr(P P PP P P H ) = (1−θ )N r , we can obtain
From (18) we know that the PSM constitutes a special case of the SPSM with θ = 1. Furthermore, we can be implied from (18) that the value of θ imposes significant impact on the achievable secrecy performance. In the following sections, two metrics, namely, error probability and secrecy rate, are considered for studying the achievable performance of the SPSM scheme. More specifically, in Section IV, we study the BER performance of the SPSM, when the value of θ is fixed for all the considered SNRs. By contrast, in Section V, we aim at maximizing the secrecy rate of the SPSM by finding the optimal value of θ for every given SNR. As a token of the efforts, our analytical results are beneficial for a SPSM transmitter to choose a desirable value of θ , in order to maximize its secrecy performance.
IV. ANALYSIS OF ERROR PROBABILITY
In this section, we analyze the error performance of both the receiver and eavesdropper. As seen in (15), in order to analyze the error probability of the eavesdropper, we need to know the statistics of the covariance matrix of (16). Explicitly, the covariance matrix is not a diagonal matrix, and analyzing the performance of (17) in general requires the random matrix theory and is very complicated. However, when N t is large resulting in a massive MIMO [36] systems, the covariance matrix converges to a diagonal matrix and in this case, the performance analysis of SPSM systems becomes feasible. Therefore, in this section, we analyze the asymptotic performance of the SPSM systems, when assuming that the transmitter, which can be a base station, employs a large number of antennas, i.e., N t N r , N e . In this case, by applying (18), the covariance matrix of (16) can be simplified to
From this we can know that w w w converges to a white Gaussian noise vector, which has zero mean and a covariance matrix
Consequently, the detector of (17) can be simplified to
whose detection performance is a function of the average SINR at the eavesdropper, which can be derived from (19) as
From (21) we can see that γ e ≈ θ/(1 − θ ), when γ → ∞. This explains that, when the system's SNR is sufficiently high, the eavesdropper's BER does not decrease with the increase of γ , but exhibits an error floor determined by θ , which is controllable by the transmitter using power allocation. Below we derive the tight analytical BER bounds of both the receiver using the detector of (7) and the eavesdropper using the detector of (20) , when assuming that all the channels experience Rayleigh fading. From our analysis and performance results, we can gain the insight into the power-allocation between ZFP and AP by adjusting the value of θ.
A. BIT ERROR RATE OF THE RECEIVER
Following the principles of digital communications, the union bound for the receiver's BER can be expressed [37] (14) , when the JD is used, the conditional PEP in 
In 
where d τ ε is defined as 
Finally, the receiver's BER union-bound can be obtained by substituting (27) into (22). 
B. BIT ERROR RATE OF THE EAVESDROPPER
where the relation 'a' holds due to lim
In (30), let us define 
In the above derivations, the equation at 'b' is due to the introduction of the alternative form of the Gaussian Q-function, which is Q (x) = π −1
2sin 2 ϕ dϕ, while the equation at 'c' is because the MGF M κ (t|f f f ) over the Rayleigh fading channels H H H e can be expressed as [38] 
Substituting (33) into (31), we obtain the average PEP as 
Finally, the approximated BER upper-bound of the eavesdropper can be obtained by substituting (34) into (28).
V. SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS AND OPTIMAL POWER-ALLOCATION
After analyzing the BER of the desired receiver and the eavesdropper, let us now analyze the secrecy rate of the SPSM system and consider the optimal power-allocation. The ergodic secrecy rate of a wiretap channel is given by [23] 
where R (θ) and R E (θ ) are the ergodic rates attainable respectively by the receiver and eavesdropper, when given the power-allocation with a factor θ . The secrecy capacity of the SPSM is given by the maximum of R s (θ ) achieved by an optimum θ , which is expressed as
where the optimal θ for (36) may be different for different SNRs.
A. EXACT SECRECY RATE FOR ANY N T
Let us denote s s s τ ε = s s s τ − s ε s ε s ε and, hence, s s s τ ε 2 = d τ ε . By following the analysis in [32] , the ergodic rate attained by the receiver can be expressed as
From (15) we know that, when N t is small, w w w is a colored noise vector with an autocorrelation matric given by (16) . According to [31] , w w w can be whitened by multiplying −1/2 on z z z of (15) without affecting the mutual information, yielding
where G G G = −1/2 H H H e and w w w = −1/2 w w w becomes a standard white Gaussian noise vector, whose elements are distributed with zero mean and unit variance. In this case, similarly to (37), we can express the ergodic rate attainable by the eavesdropper as 
Finally, the secrecy rate R s (θ ) achievable by the receiver can be obtained by substituting (37) and (39) into (35) . However, as seen in (37) and (39), neither R(θ) nor R E (θ ) are in the closed forms, and it is hard to further simplify them, as the expectations involve some highly complicated integrations related to several random matrices and vectors. Consequently, we are unable to obtain an analytical formula for C s in (36), which is provided by an optimum θ . Previously in [4] , we have evaluated the expectations of E (·) in R(θ ) and R E (θ ) via Monte-Carlo simulations for every θ value. Then, the near-optimal θ for R s (θ ) is obtained via exhaustive search. Our studies show that R s (θ) found in this way is close to the secrecy capacity C s . However, when the input-output dimensions become very large, the Monte Carlo simulation approach will involve a prohibitive computational complexity and become not feasible [28] . Hence, below we derive the approximate but closed-form formulas for R(θ ), R E (θ ) and R s (θ ), from which the optimal θ achieving the secrecy capacity C s can then be obtained with significantly reduced computations, in comparison with the Monte Carlo simulations.
B. APPROXIMATE SECRECY RATE FOR LARGE N T
As shown in (26) , when N t N r , ζ is independent of H H H . Hence, the expectation E (·) {·} in (37) is only with respect to u u u. Consequently, we can obtain a lower-bound for R(θ ), which is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: A lower-bound of R(θ ) in the case of N t N r , N e is given by
Proof: See Appendix A. For the lower-bound of R E (θ), we have known from (19) that w w w converges to a white Gaussian noise vector with a covariance matrix of σ 2 w I I I N e , where σ 2 w = (1 − θ ) + σ 2 v , when N t N r . In this case, a lower-bound as well as a upperbound for the data rate achieved by the eavesdropper can be established, which is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: In the case of N t N r , N e , a lower-bound of
and an upper-bound of R E (θ ) is given by
After careful analysis and also with the aid of the numerical demonstrations in [29] and [30] , we find that R (L) (θ ) and R (L) E (θ ) can provide very accurate approximation to R(θ ) and R E (θ ), respectively, after shifting them by a constant. In order to illustrate these, we begin with deriving the limits of R(θ ) in the low SNR and high SNR regions. Since γ = 1/σ 2 u , we can readily derive from (37) that the limits of R(θ ) are given by
Similarly, from (40), we can obtain the limits of R (L) (θ ) as
When comparing the results in (43) with the corresponding ones in (44), we realize that the lower-bound R (L) (θ ) has the same difference from R(θ ) in both the low and high SNR regions. From these results and the fact that R(θ ) is a monotonically increasing function of γ , we can be implied that at any given SNR, the difference between R(θ ) and
is approximately a constant of N r (1/ln 2 − 1). Note that this observation has also been reported in [29] and [30] for the general MIMO channels. Hence, we are confident that a very good approximation to
Similarly, R E (θ ) can be approximated bŷ
Furthermore, when MPSK is employed as the APM, then, exploiting the symmetric property of the constellations, (45) and (46) can be simplified tô
Subtracting (46) from (45), we can obtain an approximation to R s (θ ) asR
where, by definition,
Alternatively, by subtracting (42) from (45), we can obtain an approximated lower-bound of R s (θ ), which is
Based on the closed-form formulas ofR
s (θ ), the optimal values of θ for achieving the highest secrecy rate at different SNR can be readily obtained with the aid of simple one-dimensional search. Furthermore, our numerical results in Section VI-C show that, the value of θ obtained via maximizingR s (θ ) is always closer to the optimal θ , than the one obtained via maximizing R Specifically, when MPSK is employed, the values of L τ for all τ are identical, which is denoted asL. Furthermore, we can readily derive thatL = (N r − 1) × 2 for BPSK,L = (N r − 1) × 4 + 2 for QPSK, andL = 2 for M -PSK with M > 4. With the aid of the above definitions, we can express the optimum values of θ in low and high SNR regions as follows.
Theorem 3: In the low SNR region (γ 1), the value of θ maximizingR s (θ) is θ = 1. In the high SNR region (γ 1), the value of θ maximizingR s (θ ) is
for M -QAM, and
for M -PSK.
Proof: See Appendix C.
VI. PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide a range of results in order to demonstrate that: (i) SPSM inherits the low-complexity detection from PSM, while significantly enhances its security performance; (ii) our analytical results in Section IV for evaluation of BER performance is accurate for sufficiently large N t ; and (iii) the secrecy capacity of SPSM for large N t can be achieved with the optimal power-allocation obtained from the analysis in Section V. In our performance demonstration, N r = 4, i.e., 4-SSK and 16QAM are used unless they are specially mentioned.
A. LOW-COMPLEXITY DETECTION AND SECURITY PERFORMANCE Fig. 1 shows the BER versus SNR performance of the PSM and the SPSM with N t = 10, θ = 0.5. In this example, we deliberately let N e = 6 > N r = 4, allowing the eavesdropper to use the optimal ML detector in (17) , while the receiver detects using SD or JD. From Fig. 1 , first, we observe that the eavesdropper is capable of reliably detecting the PSM symbols and achieving a BER of 10 −5 , at a cost of about 4 dB more SNR than the desired receiver. Second, as in the PSM, the low-complexity SD for the SPSM is highly efficient, which can achieve nearly the same BER performance as the optimal JD. Third, by dividing half-by-half the transmit power for ZFP and AP, the receiver in the SPSM suffers from about 3 dB performance penalty, in comparison with the PSM. However, the eavesdropper's detection performance is severely degraded, with a BER always above 10 −2 in the considered SNR region. From this observation, we may further infer that, if the transmitter chooses a smaller value of θ, meaning that more power is used for AP, the eavesdropper's BER can be driven to approach 0.5, while the receiver's BER curve has the same shape as that in Fig. 1 , but shifts towards the righthand side. Fig. 2 demonstrates the accuracy of our derived BER bounds in Section IV against the Monte Carlo simulations. In this example, we set N t = 100, N r = 4 and N e = 10 in accordance with the assumption of N t N r , N e . We assumed that the receiver uses the (joint) ML detection, while the eavesdropper uses either the optimal ML detection of (17) or the simplified ML (SML) detection of (20) . Explicitly, Fig. 2 shows that our derived BER bounds are very tight for the receiver over the whole considered SNR region, and for the eavesdropper when the SNR is higher than 5 dB. The eavesdropper's BER conflicts an error floor starting appearing at about 10 dB. According to our discussion below eq. (21), the height of this floor is determined by the value of θ. Therefore, with the aid of the derived BER bounds, a transmitter can adjust the value of θ , in order to make the eavesdropper's detection performance the worst, while satisfying the BER requirement of the intended receiver. In addition to the above, from Fig. 2 we also have the following two observations. First, for the eavesdropper, the SML can achieve a similar BER performance as the optimal ML. This observation strongly supports our previous statement in Section IV that w w w appears white in space in the case of N t N e , N r . Second, benefiting from the considerable array gain provided by using a large number of transmit antennas, the receiver is capable of achieving a very low BER in the low SNR region, where the eavesdropper's BER is very high. In Fig. 3 , we investigate the effect of the number of receive antennas on the BER performance of legitimate user, and compare the simulated BER with the upper-bound of Eq. (22) analyzed in Section IV-A. From the results of Fig. 3 we observe that in general the BER bound becomes tight, provided that the SNR is sufficiently high. Specifically, in the considered case of N t = 100, the BER bound is very tight for both N r = 4 and 8, even when the SNR is as low as −2 dB. By contrast, when N r = 16, the bound is tight, provided the SNR is higher than 0 dB. Note that, the reason for the observation that the bound of Eq. (22) becomes looser when increasing N r is that this bound was derived under the condition of N t N r , as seen, e.g., in Eq. (26) . For a given N t value, this condition becomes less satisfied, as N r increases. Consequently, the bound at a given SNR becomes looser, as N r increases. Note additionally that, as PSM is usually used for downlink transmission (from base-station to mobiles), the number of receive antennas on a mobile unit should not be very large, due to its size constraint. Fig. 4 shows the exact secrecy capacity (upper subplot) and its corresponding optimal power-allocation (lower subplot) obtained by Monte Carlo simulations. The results in this figure will also be used to serve as a benchmark in the following figures, where analytical θ values are applied. From this figure, we observe that, even when the eavesdropper has the same number (N e = 4) of antennas as the receiver or has more antennas (N e = 10, 20) than the receiver, C s is capable of converging to the upper bound of log(MN r ) bits/s/Hz, as γ increases. This observation explains that, when given sufficiently high transmit power, a proper value of θ can be set by the transmitter, so that the intended receiver can successfully decode the information, while the eavesdropper is unable to due to the artificial interference. As shown in Fig. 4 , as N e increases from 4 to 20, the secrecy capacity of the SPSM decreases and, in order to achieve the secrecy capacity, the transmitter also needs to send a higher fraction of the total transmit power to interfere the eavesdropper. s (θ ). Nevertheless, even though the analytical results in Section V were obtained by assuming N t → ∞, very accurate results for power-allocation and secrecy rate can be attained, provided that N t ≥ 20 for the considered case of N r = N e = 4. Additionally, as seen in Fig. 5 , as N t increases, more power should be allocated to interfere the eavesdropper, in order to attain an increased secrecy rate. This is because, as N t increases, the desired receiver can obtain a higher transmit diversity for detection, making it require less transmit power to achieve the same reliability. Hence, the saved power can be used to interfere the eavesdropper. s (θ ), as well as the simulated R s (θ ). Their highest points are respectively marked as * , and •. First, we can notice that the values of θ achieving the three highest points are close to each other for the three SNR values considered. In particular, all the θ values equal one when the SNR is γ = −15 dB, which explains that all transmit power should be assigned to the ZFP to guarantee the receiver's detection reliability, when SNR is very low. These results verify that, for the large-scale SPSM systems, In order to see this more clearly, we plot the optimal θ * obtained from maximizing R s (θ ), and theθ and θ L obtained respectively from maximizingR s (θ ) and R (L) s (θ ) in the upper subplot of Fig. 7 . Their corresponding secrecy rates are shown in the lower subplot of Fig. 7 . What we observe is thatθ is closer to θ * than θ L when γ > −10 dB, and its corresponding secrecy rate R s (θ) is also very close to R s (θ * ), which is actually the secrecy capacity C s . In order to demonstrate the secrecy rate performance achieved byθ and θ L , when N t is moderate, in Fig. 8 , we depict the secrecy rate and corresponding powerallocation with respect to N t that varies from 10 to 100. It can be observed from Fig. 8 that, provided N t ≥ 30, the estimated θ becomes close to the optimal θ * , and the secrecy rate evaluated from Eq.(35) based onθ approaches the secrecy capacity, even when N t is as small as N t = 10, as shown in the lower subplot of Fig. 8 . The above results imply that for medium to large SPSM systems, our proposed near-optimal and yet simple power-allocation strategy is near-optimum for maximizing the secrecy rate, which can be achieved via maximizingR s (θ ).
B. VALIDATION OF ANALYTICAL BER RESULTS

C. SECRECY CAPACITY AND POWER ALLOCATION
As a matter of fact, in Fig. 7 , we have confirmed thatθ = 1 in low SNR region, which was a statement in Theorem 3 for the low SNR case. In Fig. 9 , we further demonstrate the accuracy of the asymptoticθ in high SNR region given in Theorem 3. Explicitly, Fig. 9 shows that, in sufficiently high SNR region, the asymptoticθ agrees well with the accurate results obtained from the exhaustive search. Furthermore, when comparing the two subplots, we can see that theθ estimated from the SPSM employing 16PSK is more accurate than that estimated from the SPSM employing 16QAM. Therefore, when the SNR is sufficiently high, as shown in Fig. 9 , the near-optimal power-allocation can be simply obtained from Theorem 3, without requiring any search. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have first analyzed the secrecy capability of the PSM, and explained that it is intrinsically a VOLUME 6, 2018 secrecy or, at least, a LPI transmission scheme when operated in TDD systems. However, when it is operated in the FDD systems, where CSI may have to be fed back from a receiver to its transmitter, making an eavesdropper have opportunity to obtain the CSI, the PSM's security is at risk. In order to enable the PSM to be confidently used in any scenarios, we have therefore proposed the SPSM, which uses a part of power to transmit time-varying interference, in addition to conveying information to the desired receiver. Our studies show that, for the desired receiver, the SPSM employs all the advantages of the PSM, including low-complexity detection. Then, the error performance and secrecy capacity of the SPSM have been comprehensively analyzed under a proposed theoretical framework. A range of expressions have been derived for the upper-and lower-bounds of the BER and secrecy capacity. Furthermore, by both analysis and simulations, we have investigated in detail the optimal power-allocation between information and interference transmission, in order to maximize the secrecy rate. Again, several closed-form formulas have been obtained, which allow us to find the near optimal power-allocation without invoking the Monte-Carlo search of heavy computation, but just relying on simple one-dimension search. Additionally, we have derived the asymptotical expressions for the optimal power-allocation in both low and high SNR regions. All these analytical results are beneficial to the design of SPSM systems, so as to maximize their security.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Since ζ in (26) can be treated to be independent of H H H when N t N r , the expectation E H H H ,u u u in (37) only needs to be taken over u u u. Hence, we have
where 'd' holds because of applying the Jensen's inequality to the concave function of log(x). With the aid of the result of E u u u exp
eq. (57)], we obtain the lower-bound R (L) (θ) of (40), which completes the proof.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
When N t N r , N e , w w w converges to a white Gaussian noise vector, whose elements distribute with zero mean and the variance of σ 2 w . Hence, similar to (37) , R E (θ) can be expressed as
×E 
where for N t N r we have the approximation of
Finally, by substituting (59) into (58) and, then, into (57), we obtain the lower-bound of (41). For deriving the upper-bound, since log ε exp(x ε ) is a convex function [40] , Jensen's inequality can be applied to (56) to obtain 
Finally, substituting this result into (60), we obtain the upperbound of R (U ) E (θ ) given in (42).
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Let us defined τ = . Hence F 2 in (51) can be approximated as
On the other side, F 1 can be approximated as
Substituting (63) and (64) into (49) yieldsR s (θ ), which iŝ
Taking the first derivative ofR s (θ ) with respect to θ, we can easily find that ∂R s ∂θ > 0, explaining thatR s is a monotonically increasing function of θ . Therefore, in the low SNR region, R s (θ ) is maximized by θ = 1.
Considering the high SNR region of γ 1, the product γ θ may be in one of the three possible cases, which are a) γ θ → 0, b) γ θ ≤ η with η being a bounded positive number, and c) γ θ → ∞. For the first case, calculating the expression of (49) reveals thatR s (θ ) → 0. Hence, any value of θ in this case is definitely not optimal. In the second case, it is implied that θ → 0 as γ → ∞.
Finally, for the third case, we obtain F 1 → 0 and
. Then according to (49),
indicates that the value of θ approaching 0 can produce the largestR s (θ ) and be optimum. Therefore, when taking into account of all the three cases, we are confident that the optimal θ in the high SNR region has a very small value, i.e., θ → 0 as γ → ∞. 
At the same time, the term of F 1 in (50) can be rewritten as is log-convex [40] . Hence,R s (θ ) in (69) is VOLUME 6, 2018 a concave function of θ . Therefore, the maximum ofR s (θ ) is achieved, when θ satisfies 
Finally, with the aid of the approximation 1 − θN e N r M ≈ 1, solving (70) gives the desired result of (53). By contrast, when MPSK is employed, we have the simplified expressions ofR PSK (θ ) in (47) andR E−PSK (θ ) in (48). Then, following the similar derivations for (66)-(70), we can obtain (54). For brevity, here we omit the details. He has published over 350 research papers in journals and conference proceedings, authored or co-authored three books, and also published several book chapters. The details about his research publications can be found at http://www.mobile.ecs.soton.ac.uk/lly/. His research interests include wireless communications, wireless networks, and signal processing for wireless communications, and molecular communications and nano-networks. He is a fellow of the IET (previously IEE), U.K. He has served as an associate editor for several academic journals, co-organized several special issues, and acted as different roles for conference organization. He is a Distinguished Lecturer of the IEEE Vehicular Technology Society. VOLUME 6, 2018 
